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INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11, 2001 shook America to its core. The world
was forever changed as the horrific tragedy unfolded on live television. Fami-
lies were destroyed as loved ones were severely injured or killed, leaving
spouses and children in need of aid. In response, the United States government
established the September I th Victims' Compensation Fund in an effort to
provide the necessary reparations to victims of the terrorist attacks.' This article
will analyze the September l1th Victims' Compensation Fund (hereafter
"Fund") as a way of compensating victims while preserving the financial stabil-
ity of the United States economy.
This Fund was created to address rising concerns in the wake of the terrorist
attacks regarding the continued viability of the airline industry.2 Some feared
civil liability for the events of September 11 th could force the airlines into bank-
ruptcy.3 Such an event would have been a colossal blow to the country's already
unsteady economy because the airline industry is a cornerstone of the economy.4
As such, its collapse would undoubtedly cause many thousands of Americans to
lose their jobs and shatter the public's economic confidence.
Although Congress has expressly precluded individuals from "double dip-
ping," (receiving compensation from the Fund and subsequently pursuing sepa-
* JD Candidate, 2004. I want to give special thanks to Professor Jim Gash for his help in
identifying relevant issues discussed in this article and his invaluable assistance in crafting my
thesis.
1. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 101, 115 Stat. 230
(2001).
2. See, e.g., Marilyn Adams, Bankruptcies Possible as Airlines' Losses Continue, USA
TODAY, July 18, 2002, at B I; Wendy Zellner, Industry Outlook 2002: Services: Travel, BUSINESS
WEEK, Jan. 14, 2002, at 124.
3. Id. See, e.g., Mariani v. United Air Lines, Inc. No. 01 Civ. 11628 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,
2002); Gail Appleson, American Airlines Sued for $50 Million in WTC Attack (Apr. 9, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.freerepublic.com/focuslnews/662229/posts. These are two examples of lawsuits
brought against the airlines after September 1 th. While the Mariani case was brought by a survivor
of a passenger on United Fight 175, the suit against American Airlines was brought by a survivor of
one killed in the World Trade Center.
4. Id.
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rate legal actions) some victims still choose to file suit.5 These suits attempt to
place liability for the horrific events of September 11 th onto readily identifiable
entities with deep pockets, and away from those directly responsible: the terror-
ists.6 The Fund provides a more workable alternative to tort litigation for com-
pensating victims' families.
Congress is correct in precluding individuals from double dipping for two
reasons. Firstly, there is a fundamental fairness issue,7 and secondly, most suits
filed by the families would surely fail under a negligence theory because there is
no proximate cause with which to show negligence on the part of the potential
defendants.' A suit against the airlines would likely fail, ultimately precluding
the plaintiff from receiving any compensation from the Fund. Consequently,
those individuals who seek compensation for injuries suffered on September 11,
2001 are better served by using the legislative avenue of recovery rather than the
judicial system. This country has enough frivolous litigation, and it is illogical
to encourage people to bring suits that are destined to fail. This is especially
true when a reasonable and sufficient alternative like the Fund is available.
Section I of this article focuses on the legislation resulting from the Sep-
tember 11 th tragedy, particularly the Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization
Act ("ATSSA"), which created the Fund. Section II discusses the extensive
background of the Fund, including information regarding victims' eligibility,
compensation requirements and amounts. Section III analyzes Mulligan v. Port
Authority, a recent New York decision representing one of the first judicial deci-
sions restricting the manner in which claims are filed with regard to the terrorist
attacks. Section IV discusses the fundamental fairness problems inherent in
double-dipping from the Fund. Section V explores the proximate cause issues,
which will likely cause litigants to lose their suits against private entities for the
terrorist attacks. Finally, Section VI discusses the reasons why the September
11 th Victims' Compensation fund is a better solution for compensating victims
than tort litigation.
I. LEGISLATION IN RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 1 1 TH
Eleven days after the tragic attacks, Congress enacted the Air Transporta-
tion and Safety Stabilization Act ("ATSSA").9 The goal of ATSSA was to pre-
5. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 239.
6. See James A. Gash, At the Intersection of Proximate Cause and Terrorism: A Contextual
Analysis of the (Proposed) Restatement Third of Torts' Approach to Intervening and Superceding
Causes, 91 Ky. L. J. 523 (2003).
7. See generally id.
8. Id.
9. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 101, 115 Stat. at 230.
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serve the viability of the United States air transportation system.' ATSSA pro-
vided that the President shall compensate air carriers for losses stemming from
the September II tragedy." The President was given discretion in awarding
compensation, with a ten billion-dollar aggregate limit to be awarded.' 2 Fur-
thermore, no individual air carrier was to be liable for an amount greater than
the limits of their individual liability insurance coverage.' 3 This provision en-
sures the air carriers will not be forced to expend their own capital to compen-
sate victims, thereby avoiding potential bankruptcy problems.
II. SEPTEMBER 1 IT VICTIMS' COMPENSATION FUND
The September l1th Victims' Compensation Fund was formed by the
ATSSA. 4 The purpose of the Fund is to provide compensation to any individ-
ual who was physically injured or to the families and beneficiaries of any indi-
vidual who was killed as a result of the terrorist-related incidents of September
11 th.' 5 It is a no-fault alternative to tort litigation. 6
Although the Fund provides for victims personally injured in the terrorist at-
tacks as well as those who file on behalf of a deceased victim in the tragedy, it
does not compensate for proprietary injuries such as loss of employment. 7 Eli-
gible individuals include those present at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, or
Pennsylvania crash site at the time of, or in the immediate aftermath of, the
10. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 105, 115 Stat. at 233.
II. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 101, 115 Stat. at 230.
12. Id. The Act provides, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall
take the following actions to compensate air carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result
of the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September II, 2001:
(1) Subject to such terms and conditions as the President deems necessary, issue Federal
credit instruments to air carriers that do not, in the aggregate, exceed $10,000,000,000 and
provide the subsidy amounts necessary for such instruments in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).
(2) Compensate air carriers in an aggregate amount equal to $5,000,000,000 for-
(A) direct losses incurred beginning on September 11, 2001, by air carriers as a result
of any Federal ground stop order issued by the Secretary of Transportation or any subsequent
order which continues or renews such a stoppage; and
(B) the incremental losses incurred beginning September 11, 2001, and ending De-
cember 31, 2001, by air carriers as a direct result of such attacks.
13. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 408(a), 115 Stat. at 241.
14. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 403, 115 Stat. at 237.
15. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 403, 115 Stat. at 237.
16. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 239-40.
17. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 404, 115 Stat. at 237-38.
3
Ward: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: The Answer to Victim
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
crashes and who suffered physical harm as a direct result of the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes.' 8 In addition, personal representatives of those victims killed in
American Airlines flights II and 77 or United Airlines flights 93 and 175, ex-
cluding terrorists, are eligible to file a claim. 9 Only one claim is permitted for
each victim, and all claims must have been postmarked by December 22, 2003.20
Those eligible to file a claim for a deceased victim are usually appointed by
the court of appropriate jurisdiction.2 The following are eligible: the victim's
personal representative, executor of the victim's will, or administrator of the
victim's estate.22  Submissions must include the claimant's and the victim's
Social Security number or National Identification number, original signatures,
and the last signature must be notarized.23 One must also supply supporting
documentation including notification of a filing of a claim and a list of parties
notified.24
Those individuals filing claims must provide the following information:
whether the claimant intends to file for advanced benefits, the victim's employ-
ment history, and education/accreditation history. 25 Additionally, a list of de-
pendents not listed on the victim's 2000 tax return must be included as well as
the victim's tax return information, compensation/income information, benefit
packages, non-reimbursed burial costs, memorial service costs, and medical
costs. 26 Also, the victim's collateral sources of income, the victim's will and
proposed estate distribution plan, and any other information relevant to the claim
that could be useful in awarding compensation must be included.27
In most instances, the state's wrongful death statute will govern the eco-
nomic loss portion of the Fund's award28 and the award for the victim's non-
economic loss will be distributed through the estate.29 Therefore, where there is
a will, the $250,000 in non-economic loss should be distributed according to the
will, and where the victim died without a will, the $250,000 should be distrib-
18. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(2)(A)(1), 115 Stat. at 239.
19. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(2)(B), 115 Stat. at 239.
20. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(3), 115 Stat. at 239.
21. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(2)(C), 115 Stat. at 239.
22. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(3)(A)(1), 115 Stat. at 239.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. A $50,000 advanced payment against the final compensation amount to be awarded if the
victim's family is suffering financial hardship.
26. http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/deceasedvictims.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 408, 115 Stat. at 241. Department of
Justice September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
victimcompensation/index.html.
29. Department of Justice September 11"' Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensationlindex.html (currently the victim's non-economic loss
amount is presumed to be $250,000).
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uted according to the intestacy laws of the victim's domiciliary state.3° Usually,
a spouse or dependent will be entitled to receive the additional non-economic
loss that has been added to the award on his or her behalf.
3
'
Compensation is based on values calculated from Presumed Loss Calcula-
tion Tables.32 The Presumed Loss Calculation Tables Before Collateral Offsets
contain estimated compensation data.33 The compensation data provided is not
the exact loss- it is an approximation of the presumed loss before collateral off-
sets. 34 There are currently no published presumed loss tables for victims who
suffered physical injuries.35
Compensation is awarded based on the decision of the Special Master.
3 1
These decisions are final and non-appealable. 37 However, a claimant may re-
quest a hearing on his or her claims either before the award amount is calculated
or after the calculation to request a review of the presumed award. Any claim-
ant desiring a hearing will be afforded one. Claimants can either elect to receive
the presumed award and then proceed to a hearing if they so choose, or they may
go directly to a hearing.39 The Special Master's review of whether or not to
render an award is final and not subject to judicial review.4°
In the requested hearing, the claimant is entitled to be represented by coun-
sel.4' Claimants also have the right to present evidence including documents and
witnesses, and have such other due process rights as are deemed appropriate by
the Special Master. 2 In exchange for certain recovery, claimants agree to waive
30. Id.
31. Currently this amount is presumed to be $100,000.
32. http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/index.html.
33. Id. These tables begin with an established victim age and compensable income value.
After adjustments for factors such as taxes, fringe benefits, supplemental income, and victim life
expectancy, the table sets forth an amount for the presumed economic loss of the victim. The Spe-
cial Master will then award compensation based on that figure.
34. Id. Collateral offsets include things such as pensions and insurance benefits, which serve
to compensate victims in the event of death.
35. Id. Physically injured victims should refer to the regulations.
36. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241. The Special
Master is an individual expressly trained for the claim procedure.
37. http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/faql.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241. Thus, if a
claimant elects to collect from the Fund, they cannot then challenge the adequacy of the award in the
court system.
41. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act§ 405(b)(4), 115 Stat. at 239.
42. Id.
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all rights to civil claims related to the injuries sustained, except those civil suits
necessary to collect funds from collateral sources.43
As an alternative to recovery from the Fund, ATSSA created the option for
an individual to file a claim under a federal cause of action.' ATSSA makes
this cause of action the exclusive civil remedy, vesting original and exclusive
jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.4 5 The major question is whether ATSSA will successfully lure claimants
away from the traditional time-consuming and uncertain litigation process into
the realm of certain recovery, albeit of an uncertain amount, from the Fund.46
III. MULLIGAN V. PORTAUTHORITY
Recent court orders have sought to discourage claimants from collecting
from the fund and then filing a separate suit against a civil entity.47 One order
was issued in Mulligan v. Port Authority." In Mulligan, the Honorable Alvin K.
Hellerstein, a Manhattan U.S. District Court Judge, outlined how one's filing
and service of a complaint against the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey could impact one's filing of a claim with the Fund. 9 Judge Hellerstein
wrote in pertinent part:
Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint names four plaintiffs who bring action as
individuals and as representatives of all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs argue that §7108
does not exclude the possibility of a class notice of claim. I disagree. Section 7108 requires
individual application and individual showing of claim and injury, not a generalized allega-
tion suitable for a class. Section 7108 mandates that the notice of claim contain the name and
address of each claimant, a description of the claim of that claimant, and the damages sus-
tained by that claimant. The class allegations in the First Amended Class Action Complaint
are inconsistent with the requirements of sections 7107 and 7108. Members of the class other
than the named plaintiffs are not identified, nor are their claims or damages described. Be-
cause each purported member of the class has not complied with sections 7107 and 7108,
plaintiffs cannot bring suit against the Port Authority as a class. The class allegations in the
plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint are stricken.
50
43. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat at 239. A
collateral source includes life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by
Federal, State, or local governments related to the terrorist attacks. Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, § 402(4), 115 Star. at 237.
44. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 408(b), 115 Stat. at 240-41.
45. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241.
46. See generally http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/index.html.
47. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48. Mulligan v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2002 WL 31233245 at I
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2002).
49. ld. at 1.
50. Id. at 1.
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The practical effect of this ruling, should it pass appellate review, is the
prohibition of the filing of class actions by the September II victims in New
York State. There are two possible consequences: either many victims will
settle for compensation through the Fund rather than trying a case individually
which would be difficult and financially burdensome, or victims will litigate
their claims, clogging the nation's court systems with numerous scattered suits.
The latter consequence is detrimental to all parties involved because it frustrates
non-litigious victims' efforts to receive their rightful compensation. Addition-
ally, it creates an unnecessary burden on the court system.5
IV. FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS PROBLEMS
Congress' prohibition of double dipping from the Fund as well as collateral
sources is both necessary and appropriate. To allow double dipping would be
fundamentally unfair to those victims choosing not to file suit. Each claim is
deducted from an aggregate pool of money comprising the Fund.52 As such, the
more claims that are paid from the Fund, the smaller the aggregate pool of
money will become. Consequently, allowing victims to collect from the Fund
and also file suit would be unfair to potential claimants who may not be able to
recover at all because the Fund would be depleted. As of January 1, 2004, 2,884
death claims and 4,185 injury claims were filed. 3 Given the uncertainty of the
value of future claims, fundamental notions of fairness dictate that individuals
intending to collect from both the Fund and a lawsuit must be precluded from
collecting before those victims seeking compensation exclusively from the
Fund. Accordingly, Congress is justified in its prohibition of double recovery
from the Fund and collateral sources.
51. I say "needless burden" because it is highly probable that those victims' tort claims will
rest on a theory of negligence, which has a required element of proximate cause. Most courts, and
reasonable juries would conclude that the extent of harm conceived for letting the terrorists on the
planes with box cutters is not that the Towers would fall. Thus, there is likely no proximate cause
element, and the tort claims would largely fail. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see infra
notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
52. Air Transportation and Safety Stabilization Act § 406, 115 Stat. at 240. See generally
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/index.html.
53. David W. Chen, Man Behind Sept. II Fund Describes Effort as a Success, With Reserva-
tions, NEW YORK TIMES, January 1, 2004 at B 1.
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V. PROBLEMS WITH PROXIMATE CAUSE
Tort litigation is element-driven; to succeed in court, a plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving all elements of the particular cause of action.54 To succeed on a
negligence theory of liability, there must be a breach of a duty that causes dam-
age to a party.55 In addition, the breach of the duty must be both the actual and
proximate cause of the damages.56 While the breach, duty, factual cause, and
damages elements are fairly straightforward, juries often find the issue of
proximate cause difficult and confusing.
57
A. Palsgraf: The Foundation of Proximate Cause
In order to understand proximate cause in its proper context and function, it
is important to analyze Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company.58 Justice
Cardozo's majority opinion forms the basis for all legitimate proximate cause
analyses.5 9 In Palsgraf, two men attempted to board a moving train.6° While
one succeeded, the other lost his balance and dropped a small package he was
carrying onto the railroad tracks. 6' The package contained fireworks that ex-
ploded when it landed on the tracks. 62 The vibration from the explosion caused
a scale to tip over and strike the plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf, while she was standing
on the far end of the train station platform.63 The trial court found that the negli-
gence of the train employees in assisting the man aboard the train actually
caused the package to fall onto the tracks. 64
In the majority opinion, Justice Cardozo resolved the case on grounds unre-
lated to proximate cause, insisting that causation had nothing to do with the
54. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM (Basic Principles) (Tentative Draft No.2 March 25, 2002).
55. Id.
56. Id. The restatement defines factual cause as the following:
§ 26. Factual Cause: An actor's tortious conduct must be a factual cause of another's
physical harm for liability to be imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm
would not have occurred absent the conduct. Tortious conduct may also be a factual cause
of harm under § 27.
And although it is not expressly defined, proximate cause is analyzed accordingly:
§ 29. Limitations on Liability for Tortious Conduct: An actor is not liable for harm differ-
ent from the harms whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious.
57. See Gash, supra note 6 at 531 n.50.
58. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
59. See Gash, supra note 6 at 531 n.50.
60. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Gash, supra note 6, at 533 (citing Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101).
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plaintiff's injuries. 65 He stated "[tihe law of causation, remote or proximate, is
thus foreign to the case before us."'  Justice Cardozo chose to analyze the case
with regard to whether the train employee breached a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf 67
He perceived the scope of the duty to be a function of the risk presented by the
allegedly tortious conduct.68 "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others
within the range of apprehension."'69 Thus, in Palsgraf, the reasonably foresee-
able risks could include personal injury to the man trying to board the moving
train and possible damage to his package. It could even be argued that it was
reasonably foreseeable that the package might damage the railroad tracks, de-
pending on its size and weight.7 °
Put more simply, some scholars have conceptualized Justice Cardozo's risk
analysis as consisting of "spheres of danger," which create a spatial design for
imposing liability.7 That is, those reasonably foreseeable risks from the breach
compose a sphere of danger, and any damages resulting from a risk inside the
sphere give rise to liability. Conversely, damages resulting from risks outside
the sphere do not permit recovery. The critical question in Justice Cardozo's
view was whether the risk was within the sphere of danger. Specifically, in
Palsgraf, the question was whether the risk of a scale falling on a woman stand-
ing on the platform a great distance away was reasonably foreseeable were a
man to drop a package onto railroad tracks while trying to board a moving
train.73 Justice Cardozo answered in the negative, finding that the wrongfulness
of the act (the man boarding a moving train) was irrelevant. 7
65. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 101.
66. Id.
67. See Gash supra note 6 at 533 (citing Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100). Justice Cardozo openly
questioned whether the train employee actually breached a duty of care to the man he was helping
into the train. See id. at 533. (Cardozo stated, "If there was a wrong to [the man carrying the pack-
age] at all, which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong to a property interest only, the safety of
his package.").
68. Id.
69. Palsgraf 164 N.E. at 101.
70. See Gash, supra note 6 at 533 (2003).
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 100)(referring to what Cardozo called the "orbit of dan-
ger" and "orbit of duty" as defining the scope of responsibility); see also Palsgraf 164 N.E at 102
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (characterizing Justice Cardozo's approach as creating a "radius of dan-
ger").
73. Id.
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Modernly, courts routinely hold that an actor owes a broader duty of care
with regard to physical harm than that suggested by Justice Cardozo. 75 How-
ever, the current test for proximate cause does include a "scope of the risk" in-
quiry, which essentially employs the Cardozian view of the sphere of danger.76
Without proving proximate cause, the tort of negligence is not a viable option
and recovery is impossible.77
B. Proximate cause analysis: Risk/Utility Test
Every analysis of proximate cause, in one way or another,78 involves the
risk/utility test often written as "B<PL., 79 That is, the burden of refraining from
the conduct ("B") must be less than the probability of injury ("P") multiplied by
the gravity of harm ("L"). Law students throughout the United States are famil-
iar with this analysis as a method of ascertaining whether an individual negli-
gently breached a duty of care by falling below the standard of care of a rea-
sonably prudent person.
Courts use the benchmark standard of care of the reasonably prudent person
because all aspects of conduct carry some degree of risk, and to make conduct
tortious when it carried some degree of risk would be tantamount to strict liabil-
ity.80 Strict liability refers to liability that does not depend on actual negligence
or intent to harm, but is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make some-
thing safe.8' A strict liability tort system for negligent conduct would not only
prove ineffective, but also dangerous. Individuals would not be able to function
in our litigious society for fear of being subject to constant civil liability. Busi-
nesses could not operate, many public services would be discontinued, and our
74. Id. (discussing the language used in both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion
with regard to the scope of the duty owed).
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS n. 4, § 29, cmt. n. 6) ("Ordinarily, the
risk standard contained in this section will, without requiring any separate reference to the foresee-
ability of the plaintiff, preclude liability for harm to such plaintiffs."); id. ("Generally, application of
the risk standard should avoid much of the need for consideration of unforeseeable plaintiffs.").
77. Id. (for more information on the current state of the "scope of the risk" debate including
the RESTATEMENT THIRD approach).
78. See Gash, supra note 6 at 536 (citing McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557
(7"h Cir. 1987)) ("Ordinarily... the parties do not give the jury the information required to quantify
the variables that the Hand Formula picks out as relevant. That is why the formula has greater ana-
lytic than operational significance.").
79. This test was originated by Judge Learned Hand shortly after Palsgraf was decided. See
id. (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)). In that case he
explained that a person fails to act as an ordinary reasonable person when the probability of harm
risked by certain actions ("P") multiplied by the gravity of harm risked by such conduct ("L") out-
weighs the burden of not engaging in the conduct ("B").
80. Id.
81. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999).
10
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freedom as we know it would be forever changed. Consequently, the courts
have settled upon the universal standard of care as that of the reasonably prudent
person.82
C. Proximate Cause Analysis of the September 11th Attacks
The next step in this review of the September 11 th tragedy is to conduct a
risk/utility analysis.83 Such an analysis is essential for any September 11 victim
who elects to forego compensation from the Fund and file a negligence suit
against a private entity. Without the requisite proximate cause, the action would
fail, leaving the victim with no compensation for injuries sustained.
With respect to the September 11 victims, the issue revolves around the
scope of duty the airlines owed individuals. Following Justice Cardozo's analy-
sis, the author would argue that a legal snapshot should be taken at the moment
of impact between the planes and their targets to determine the reasonable risks
associated with the allegedly negligent conduct: in this case, letting the terrorists
onto the planes with box-cutters s' Those reasonably foreseeable risks associ-
ated with the conduct would fit inside the sphere of danger, and result in
grounds for liability.
In the case of the terrorist attacks, there may be some debate over the fore-
seeable risks.of allowing terrorists onto the planes with weapons. It seems clear
that no one had ever contemplated terrorists using commercial airliners as
weapons of mass destruction. The risk to individuals located outside the planes
seemed rather remote, and certainly outside the zone of danger.85
However, upon closer examination, the risk to those outside the planes may
not have been as unforeseeable as first imagined. Reports have surfaced follow-
ing the tragedy that suggest that a Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") offi-
82. Id. (The law assumes that this reasonably prudent person, prior to engaging in any particu-
lar conduct, evaluates the risks posed by that conduct and balances those risks against the utility to
be gained by engaging in such conduct. If the risks of harm posed by the conduct outweigh the
utility of engaging in that conduct, then the reasonably prudent person will necessarily not engage in
the conduct.).
83. For the purposes of this section, the discussion focuses on the potential liability of the
airline industry.
84. See Gash supra note 6 at 541 (describing the notion of a legal snapshot).
85. Obviously those victims that were inside the jets were within the sphere of danger. The
risk to potential hostages upon letting terrorists with weapons onto a plane is clearly foreseeable.
Thus, this section will focus on the foreseeability of risk to those victims not physically on the
planes.
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cial in Phoenix wrote a memo prior to September 11, 2001, expressing concern
about a number of pilots of Middle-Eastern citizenship training at nearby flight
schools.8 6 Apparently, the official's supervisors neither acted upon the memo,
nor disseminated it within the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, or other
governmental agencies.8 7 Moreover, the New York Times best-selling and popu-
lar author, Tom Clancy, wrote about a fictional situation where a terrorist flew a
commercial jet into the Capitol in an attempt to kill the President.8
The central question remains: are these victims outside the doomed planes
within the Cardozian sphere of danger? If so, the airlines would have owed
those individuals a duty of care, which they obviously breached. Thus, under
the Cardozian view, they could recover damages against the airlines.89
It seems that counting individuals not physically in the planes within the
sphere of danger is over-inclusive. To permit such inclusion would be tanta-
mount to applying strict liability to the September 1 th tragedy. In order to
maximize efficiency, courts have made the applicable standard of care that of
the reasonably prudent person.' Allowing the sphere of danger to extend to
those victims on the ground would negate the reasonably prudent person con-
cept.
This extension of the sphere of danger essentially follows Justice Andrew's.
dissenting opinion in Palsgraf. Justice Andrews maintained that one owes a
duty to all, not just those in the zone of danger.9' Applying the Andrews view to
September 11,92 the people in the World Trade Center and Pentagon were within
the zone of danger the moment the terrorists entered the planes with weapons.
This view makes little sense because everyone within the flight range of the
planes would then be in foreseeable danger. Therefore, it may be absurd to
claim that the victims not physically in the planes were within the reasonably
foreseeable sphere of danger at the time the terrorists entered the planes. Fol-
lowing this logic, it is difficult to imagine any way in which victims not on the
planes could recover from the airlines.
Applying the risk/utility analysis to the victims on the ground, it is obvious
the airlines are not the proximate cause of the victims' injuries and damages. To
determine whether the airlines were the proximate cause of the victims' injuries
86. See http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/WM100.cfm.
87. Id.
88. See generally TOM CLANCY, EXECUTIVE ORDERS 5-6 (Thomdike
Press 1996).
89. This presupposes that they also proved the remaining elements of the tort (i.e. damages).
90. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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and damages, a simple three-step query is appropriate. The initial inquiry is:
what types of harm did the airlines reasonably foresee at the time of the alleg-
edly tortious conduct?94 The second question is: is the type of harm actually
caused to the victims not physically in the planes was one of the types of harm
identified in the first query?95 The third and final question is: was the harm
actually suffered sufficiently probable to occur and sufficiently grave to the
extent that it is proper to render the airlines' conduct tortious?9 6 If these ques-
tions are answered in the affirmative, proximate cause exists and liability is
appropriate. If not, proximate cause does not exist and no liability is appropri-
ate.97
With regard to the initial question, the type of harm reasonably foreseeable
at the time the terrorists were allowed on the planes was relatively limited. The
most obvious would be risk to the passengers being held hostage. There might
also have been a foreseeable risk to personal property and the airplanes them-
selves. In any event, the reasonably foreseeable risks were in and around the
planes themselves. Secondly, the type of harm suffered by those victims not
physically in the airplanes was a type of harm suggested in question one, namely
physical harm or death. Thus, the crux of the analysis comes down to the final
question regarding probability and gravity of harm. Although the gravity of the
harm could hardly have been worse, the test probably fails with regard to prob-
ability of harm. There was no reason to foresee that those victims in the World
Trade Center and Pentagon would suffer physical harm when the terrorists en-
tered the planes. This is evidenced by the fact that the initial news reports sug-
gested the first crash into World Trade Center Tower Two was probably an ac-
cident.98 Furthermore, the passengers on the planes did not initially resist the
terrorists because they thought it was likely they would remain safe throughout
the ordeal. It was only after the first plane crashed and passengers on board
began to hear reports via their cell phones that any resistance was shown by
passengers on the planes.99 Consequently, it is difficult to argue there was any
foreseeable risk to the victims in the World Trade Center Towers and the Penta-
93. See Gash, supra note 6 at 602.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Phil Hirschkorn, Lawsuits Likely After WTC Attacks, CNN (Oct. 10, 2001), available at
www.cnn.comI200 I/US/10/10/rec.tower.evacuation/index.html.
99. See www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/ l/ar9l1 l.memorial.pennsylvania/index.html.
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gon, especially since those victims in the planes did not even fully believe they
were at risk until well after the attacks had commenced.
Moreover, most passengers believed the terrorists would negotiate for their
demands, rather than destroy the planes. Thus, it is hard to say there was any
real probability of risk to victims on the ground."°° Consequently, the third step
in the risk/utility analysis fails, and liability to the airlines for damages suffered
by those victims on the ground is likely inappropriate.
VI. THE VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND: A BETTER CHOICE
The Fund is a far better choice than tort litigation for victims seeking com-
pensation for damages suffered in connection to the September 11 th tragedy.
Notwithstanding the fact that the lawsuits are destined to fail due to proximate
cause concerns, the results would be equally devastating should they somehow
succeed. Successful tort litigation would lead to financial crisis for the airlines.
In the presently recovering economy, the airlines currently teeter on the brink of
bankruptcy.'0 ' Any additional financial adversity might push them over the
edge.
For example, United Airlines recently filed for bankruptcy.'0 2 While United
continues to operate, financial liability to the victims of September 11 th could
very well force the company to fold, causing damage to thousands of investors,
workers, and travelers.
Airlines are an integral part of the American economy and their continued
viability is of national concern.'0 3 Not only would those directly connected to
the airline industry be adversely affected, there would also be a trickle-down
effect that would spread throughout the country. Those who lose their jobs will
be forced to collect unemployment, investments will decline, and businesses will
likely have to curtail their national business ventures due to the difficulty in
travel arrangements. Consequently, the actions of a few plaintiffs could poten-
tially harm society as a whole. Given the uncertain nature of the suits, and the
socially adverse effect the suits could have, recompense from the Fund is a bet-
ter avenue for victim compensation.
100. There was a probability of grave harm to those in the planes; thus the airlines are likely
liable for damages suffered by those victims. My argument is that the three-step B<PL analysis fails
to impose liability on the airlines for the damages suffered by those victims on the ground.
101. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
102. See http://www.cnn.com/2002/TRAVEU12/08/united.bankruptcy/index.html.
103. Id.
14
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol4/iss1/6
[Vol. 4: 161, 2003]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
VII. CONCLUSION
The September 1 1th Victims' Compensation Fund is a more appropriate
method of compensating victims of this tragedy than tort litigation. Yet, there
may be ways to refine the Fund's claim process to more adequately compensate
victims. One solution is to allow mediation as a method of resolving a claim,
rather than the Special Master ruling, in order to give claimants a more effective
venue in which to argue their cases. Currently, victims are permitted to have a
hearing in front of the Special Master with the goal of fully explaining their
claims. Victims may present witnesses and evidence to the Special Master.
While these hearings are a good idea, they may not be the best option available.
Mediation would provide a vehicle for the victims to be heard while minimizing
the cost of litigation.
Through mediation, victims can participate in the process of compensation.
By allowing the victims to discuss their claims, it may allow them to achieve
closure. Often, when dealing with a tragedy, communicating one's feelings in a
mediation-like venue facilitates the healing process. The mediation process
would allow such communication, whereas an evidentiary hearing would not.
While the ultimate result of mediation and a hearing may not differ significantly,
mediation could be extremely beneficial.
The emphasis of mediation is the process itself, not the result. Neutral me-
diators are abundant, and the sessions could be relatively informal. It is essen-
tial that victims are allowed to participate in the claim and are given a substan-
tial role in the award determination process. If victims utilized mediation, the
Fund could be a truly effective source of compensation, both financial and, per-
haps more importantly, emotional.
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